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STATEMENT RELATED TO OTHER APPEALS 
In re Discipline D. Bruce Oliver, case no. 20080087-SC 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
D. Bruce Oliver, Appellant appeals the final order and judgment of the Honorable 
Anthony B. Quinn, of his 12/08/09 Minute Entry, certified as a final order on February 5, 
2010. (R. 2328-2329 & 2356-2357) (See exhibit I & J). This Court has jurisdiction of 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(c) (discipline of lawyers). The 
order entered by the trial court should have mirrored sanctions imposed by the other 
jurisdiction. (See exhibit A) (e.g. R. 2274-2276) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue One: When an attorney is publically disciplined in another jurisdiction 
and the Utah State Bar by and through Office of Professional Conduct seeks to impose 
reciprocal discipline through a District Court in Utah, based solely on the initial 
discipline, is the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court in Utah limited to the 
"equivalent' discipline as was imposed in the initiating tribunal? Yes. 
Standard of Review: "[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment is based 
on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is 
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against 
whom it runs. See In re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168, 170 n. 5 (Colo. 1981); 11 C 
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973). Therefore, the 
propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, 
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court. See Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). (sic)" State, Dept. of Social 
Services v. Vijil, 784 P. 2d 1130 (Utah 1989). 
"Unlike matters within the general jurisdiction of the district courts, lawyer 
discipline matters come to the district court as a partial delegation of our authority. 
Under this court's constitutional mandate to govern "by rule" the practice of law, we 
therefore review the district court's interpretation of the RLDD for correctness. In re 
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, \ 12, 87 P.3d 712 (discussing article VIII, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution, which grants this court the power to regulate the practice of law)." In re 
Discipline ofWelker, 100 P. 3d 1197 (Utah 2004). 
Preservation of Issue: (R. 2262-2320) 
2. Issue Two: In this case did the District Court exceed its subject matter jurisdiction 
in the order dated January 9th, 2007? Yes. 
Standard of Review: "[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment is based 
on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is 
lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against 
whom it runs. See In re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168, 170 n. 5 (Colo. 1981); 11 C. 
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973). Therefore, the 
propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, 
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becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court. See Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). (sic)" State, Dept. of Social 
Services v. Vijil, 784 P. 2d 1130 (Utah 1989). 
"Unlike matters within the general jurisdiction of the district courts, lawyer 
discipline matters come to the district court as a partial delegation of our authority. 
Under this court's constitutional mandate to govern "by rule" the practice of law, we 
therefore review the district court's interpretation of the RLDD for correctness. In re 
Sonnenreich 2004 UT 3, f 12, 87 P.3d 712 (discussing article VIII, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution, which grants this court the power to regulate the practice of law)." In re 
Discipline ofWelker, 100 P. 3d 1197 (Utah 2004). 
Preservation of Issue: (R. 2262-2320) 
3. Issue Three: May challenges to subject matter jurisdiction be raised at any time, 
even for the first time on appeal? Yes. 
Standard of Review: "[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a 
claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, 
the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs. 
See In re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168,170 n. 5 (Colo. 1981); 11 C Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973). Therefore, the propriety of the 
jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question of 
law upon which we do not defer to the district court. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
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Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 
P.2d 245,247 (Utah 1988). (sic)" State, Dept. of Social Services v. Vijil, 784 P. 2d 1130 
(Utah 1989). 
"Unlike matters within the general jurisdiction of the district courts, lawyer 
discipline matters come to the district court as a partial delegation of our authority. 
Under this court's constitutional mandate to govern "by rule" the practice of law, we 
therefore review the district court's interpretation of the RLDD for correctness. In re 
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, \\2, 87 P.3d 712 (discussing article VIII, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution, which grants this court the power to regulate the practice of law)." In re 
Discipline ofWelker, 100 P. 3d 1197 (Utah 2004). 
Preservation of Issue: (R. 2262-2320) 
STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 14-509, Utah Supreme Court Rules (exhibit D) 
Rule 14-522, Utah Supreme Court Rules (exhibit E) 
Due Process Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const, (exhibit F) 
Article VIII, Section 4, Utah Const, (exhibit G) 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (exhibit H) 
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STATEMENTS OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appeal is concerning the discipline of a lawyer, D. Bruce Oliver. On 
November 5, 2009, Mr. Oliver filed a Motion to Correct Order for Lack of Jurisdiction. 
The trial court judge, Anthony B. Quinn, denied the motion. (R. 2262-2320; 2328-
2329; 2356-2357) 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On January 9, 2008, the trial court entered an order of discipline against D. Bruce 
Oliver. That Order intended to be an Order of Reciprocal Discipline, bearing the name as 
such. That Order of Reciprocal Discipline purported to follow the discipline of another 
jurisdiction, the United States District Court, for the District of Utah. (R. 2209-2227) 
The order was supposed to carry only a one-year suspension period. (R. 2224-2225) 
On November 5, 2009, Mr. Oliver filed a motion to correct the order, because the 
order entered contained additional sanctions not imposed by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Utah. (R. 2262-2320). After the issue was fully briefed, the trial court 
denied the motion. (R. 2328-2329; 2356-2357) 
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The trial court entered the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order of Reciprocal Discipline: Reprimand and Suspension on January 9, 2008. (R. 
2209-2227) 
2. The effective date of the order was February 8, 2008 and Mr. Oliver was 
suspended for one year beginning on February 8, 2008. (R. 2226) 
3. Mr. Oliver filed his Notice of Appeal on January 18, 2008. (R. 2251) 
4. The Utah Supreme Court entered default dismissal on April 22, 2008. (See 
prior appeal, case #20080087-SC). (R. 2258-2261) 
5. On November 5, 2009, Mr. Oliver moved for the correction of the trial 
court's order raising jurisdictional grounds for correction. (R. 2262-2263) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules 14-509 and 14-522, the trial court exceeded 
his jurisdiction. The Order of Reciprocal Discipline contained additional sanctions that it 
was not authorized to additionally impose in the course of disciplining a lawyer upon 
reciprocal grounds. (R. 2262-2320) 
6 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT ONE. 
WHEN AN ATTORNEY IS PUBLIC ALLY DISCIPLINED IN ANOTHER 
JURISDICTION AND THE UTAH STATE BAR BY AND THROUGH OFFICE 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT SEEKS TO IMPOSE RECIPROCAL 
DISCIPLINE THROUGH A DISTRICT COURT IN UTAH, BASED SOLELY ON 
THE INITIAL DISCIPLINE, IS THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF 
THE DISCTRICT COURT IN UTAH LIMITED TO THE "EQUIVALENT" 
DISCIPLINE AS WAS IMPOSED IN THE INITIATING TRIBUNAL? 
Supreme Court Rule 14-509 of the Rule for Lawyer Discipline and Disability (herein 
after 14-509 RLD 1)) provides that there are 5 grounds to discipline an attorney. It provides that 
there are 5 grounds to discipline an attorney. It provides: 
Rule 14-509. Grounds for discipline. 
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; 
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening 
panel imposing discipline; 
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction; 
(d) fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 14-526(e); 
or 
(e) fail to notify the OPC of public discipline in another 
jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 14-522(a). 
Paragraph (c) provides the basis for discipline against appellant in this matter. The 
allegation that appellant was disciplined by the Federal Court, is undisputed, (see Exhibit A) It is 
also undisputed that the discipline in the Federal Court was the sole basis for the discipline of 
appellant by the Office of Professional Conduct (OPC). On June 5th, 2007 OPC corresponded 
with Chief Justice Christine M. Durham requesting that she designate the appropriate forum 
wherein the action should be filed, (see exhibit B). In pertinent part the letter states "(OPC) 
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intends to seek reciprocal discipline against D. Bruce Oliver based upon action taken by the 
United States District Court of the District of Utah." 
The very title of the order prepared by OPC and submitted to Judge Quinn and signed by 
him is "ORDER OF RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE" (see exhibit C). When an attorney is subject 
to "Reciprocal Discipline" in Utah, OPC is governed by different rules than attorneys who are 
disciplined in Utah with the complaint originating through OPC. Reciprocal discipline is 
governed by RLDD Rule 14-522. RLDD Rule 14-522 provides specifically that after 
adjudication in the originating tribunal that a respondent has been adjudicated guilty of 
misconduct "shall establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of disciplinary proceedings 
in Utah." (RLDD Rule 14-522(e)). The merits of the case in the originating tribunal are 
conclusive and not subject to further litigation in Utah. A respondent can only challenge 1) 
deprivation of due process 2) equivalent discipline would result in grave injustice or (3) that the 
conduct would warrant a different outcome in Utah or that the conduct would not be misconduct 
in Utah, (see RLDD 14-522 (d)(l-3)) When this Court promulgated RLDD 14-522 it determined 
that a hearing in the originating tribunal was all that was needed in Utah to impose Reciprocal 
Discipline. In Utah a Respondent to Reciprocal Discipline is not entitled to go through the 
standard channels of imposing discipline on an attorney in Utah. The respondent is deprived of a 
screening panel and the opportunity to be heard by his peers before the Utah State Bar. There is 
not just a presumption of correctness (which could be rebutted) but rather a finding of 
conclusiveness (which is not rebuttable) under the provisions of RLDD 14-522 (e). 
It appears as if this depravation of a respondent's due process in Utah was offset by this 
Court in RLDD 14-522 where in this Court mandated that any discipline which was imposed as 
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Reciprocal Discipline be the "equivalent" of the discipline imposed in the originating tribunal 
(see RLDD 14-522). In three sub-sections of RLDD 14-522 the rule provides for "equivalent' 
discipline. This then establishes the jurisdictional limits of Utah Courts as it pertains to 
reciprocal discipline (This is not applicable to discipline originating from the Utah State Bar or 
OPC). When OPC chooses to use Reciprocal Discipline to "establish conclusively the 
misconduct for purposes of disciplinary proceeding in Utah" then OPC and the Court are limited 
to imposing "equivalent" discipline upon the respondent. If OPC chooses to deviate from the 
originating tribunal, the respondent should be afforded due process which would include, at a 
minimum, notice and a hearing. 
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). 
Therefore, when an attorney is subjected to reciprocal discipline under RLDD 14-522 the 
discipline is indeed reciprocal and equivalent to the discipline imposed by the originating 
tribunal. It is then the order in the originating tribunal which limits the jurisdiction of the State 
Court. In reciprocal discipline cases the jurisdiction of the Utah Court is the "equivalent" as 
established by the originating tribunal, to exceed the "equivalent" discipline would deprive 
respondent of his constitutionally provided and protected due process. The United States 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) stated: 
The "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer 
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve 
the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a 
principle basic to our society." Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). The fundamental requirement of due process is 
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the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner." 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965); see Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 
(1914). 
When an attorney is publically disciplined in another jurisdiction and the Utah State Bar 
by and through Office of Professional Conduct seeks to impose reciprocal discipline through a 
District Court in Utah, based solely on the initial discipline, is the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the District Court in Utah limited to the "equivalent' discipline as was imposed in the initiating 
tribunal? The answer in this situation is "Yes." 
POINT TWO, 
IN THIS CASE DID THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEED ITS SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISTICTION IN THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 9T H , 2007? 
The order signed by the Court on January 9th, 2007 exceeded the jurisdiction of the Court 
as established in RLDD 14-522 when it imposed sanctions in excess of the sanctions imposed in 
the Federal Order of Discipline by adding extraneous provisions. When the Utah Court added 
provisions not included in the Federal order it exceeded its jurisdiction. 
The Court has indicated that when interpreting statutes it will rely on the clear meaning 
of words which were used advisedly by the legislature. 
In State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 40 (Utah 2002) this court 
explained the method of interpreting statute (or rules) using the plain meang method: 
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In interpreting statute, our paramount concern is to give 
effect to the legislative intent, manifest by the plain 
language of the statute. State v. Lusk 2001 UT102, \19; 37 
P3d 1103; Rezallns. Co. v. BotU 2001 UT 71, \W; 31 P3d 
524; City of Hillsdale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, \36; 28 P3d 
697. Unless a statute is ambiguous, we will not look beyond 
the plain language of the statute. Lusk 2001 UT 102, ^19. 
In doing so we "presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly and [we] give effect to the term according 
to its ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. v Johnson, 
1999 UT 35; 977 P.d 479, %9; 977 P.2d 479 (quoting 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 
1995)), and "we seek to render all parts [of the statutes] 
revelant and meaningful." 
Hall v. State Department ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, T[15; 24 P.3d 958 (quoting, Millet v. Clark Clinic 
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)). 
While this is specifically referencing statutes it is just as applicable to rules promulgated 
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional authority (see Art. VIII, Section 4, Utah State 
Constitution). Assuming that the Court chose its words advisedly and that we may rely on the 
plain meaning of those words, the use of the word "equivalent" limits the jurisdiction of the trial 
court. By adding additional procedures for reinstatement over and above those required by the 
Federal Court, the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction. A quick perusal of the two orders 
clarifies any issues or doubts (see exhibit A and C). The offending provisions in the Utah order 
are those which state "It is FURTHER ORDERED..." On its face these provisions are additional 
requirements over and above the federal order of discipline. The contents of the Federal order are 
stated prior to these 3 additional paragraphs and requirements. When the jurisdiction of the Court 
is clearly set out, any time the Court ventures outside the parameters of this clearly delineated 
jurisdiction its actions are void. In State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995) the Court indicates 
that jurisdiction should be raiseable at this time. 
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When a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate court can 
vacate the illegal sentence without first remanding the case 
to the trial court, even if the matter was never raised 
before. This makes theoretical sense because an illegal 
sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, should be 
raisable at any time, (emphasis added) 
Here in a criminal case the Court compares an illegal sentence to (subject matter) 
jurisdiction which is raiseable at any time. 
An equivalent comparison as to what the Court can and cannot do in a circumstance such 
as this is, by comparison, in a criminal case sentencing. If the law provides that the maximum 
fine to be imposed is $ 1000.00 the court cannot impose a fine of $ 1,000.01. The court lacks 
jurisdiction to increase the fine. If the law provides that the maximum period of time for 
imprisonment is 6 months in jail the court cannot impose a jail sentence of 6 months and 1 
minute. The court lacks jurisdiction to increase the jail sentence. The equivalent principle applies 
to this case. When the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court of Utah states that reciprocal 
sanction shall be "equivalent" to those sanctions imposed by the originating tribunal, that's what 
the jurisdiction of this court is. 
In this case when the order of the Court dated January 9 , 2007 exceeded the 
"equivalent" of the Federal order, the Utah Court exceeded its jurisdiction as set out by the 
Supreme Court. In Kawamoto v. Fratto, 994 P. 2d 187 (Utah 2000), this Court while 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the concerns of a party to a small claims action recognized that 
the courts are bound by the language of the statute. In footnote number 5 the Court makes a clean 
and unrefutable statement of the dilemma faced by the Court between practicality and the 
statutory language when it states: 
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The dissenting opinion cogently summarizes the policy 
reasons for changing the statute to take those types of cases 
out of small claims court. This court cannot rewrite the 
statute, but we agree with the dissent that it needs review, 
and hope that the legislature will undertake consideration 
of the problems identified by this case and by the dissent. 
Following the clear and unambiguous words of the rule are preferable to blazing new 
trails without jurisdiction. 
In 2004, this Court ruled that the reference to "equivalent" in RLDD 14-522 means 
equal or lesser not more. In the case of In the Matter of the Discipline ofK Delbert Welker 
#3118, 100 P. 3d 1197 (Utah 2004) this Court made a clear and unequivocal statement that: 
[A]s the District Court noted, it is clear from the language in subsection (d) of Rule 22, 
which allows the respondent attorney to contest equivalent discipline, that the 
possibility of only an equivalent or less sever sanction was contemplated by the drafter 
of the rule. 
Thus it is clear that this Court has previously concluded that the word equivalent is a 
phrase or word establishing the jurisdiction of the Utah Court as it relates to reciprocal discipline 
of attorneys in Utah. 
In this case did the District Court exceed its subject matter jurisdiction in the order dated 
January 9th, 2007? The answer is "Yes." 
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POINT THREE. 
MAY CHALLENGES TO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BE RAISED AT 
ANY TIME, EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL? 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (4) allows the Court to review a void order. By the 
nature of the fact that a void order is "void" there is no time limit to review and correct such an 
order. In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P 2d 288 (Utah 1986) this Court stated: 
This is consistent with holdings under the Federal Rules, 
after which our Rules were patterned. As noted in Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862: 
Rule 60(b)(4) [the equivalent to Utah Rule 60(b)(5)] 
authorizes relief from void judgments. Necessarily a motion 
under this part of the rule differs markedly from motions 
under the other clauses of Rule 60(b). There is no question 
of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is 
under Rule 60(b)(4). Nor is there any requirement, as there 
usually is when default judgments are attacked under Rule 
60(b), that the moving party show that he has a meritorious 
defense. 291 *291 Either a judgment is void or it is valid. 
Determining which it is may well present a difficult 
question, but when that question is resolved, the court must 
act accordingly. 
By the same token, there is no time limit on an attack on a 
judgment as void. The one-year [three-month, in Utah] 
limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is expressly 
inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be 
made within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to 
apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4), cannot be enforced 
with regard to this class of motion. A void judgment cannot 
acquire validity because of laches on the part of the 
judgment debtor. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
In the case of Bernard v. Wasserman, 855 P. 2d 243 (Utah 1993) the Court stated: 
This court has made it clear that challenges to subject 
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any tme and cannot be 
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waived by the parties. Olson, 724 P.2d at 964; Utah Dep 't 
of Bus. Reg., 602P.2dat699; UtahR.Civ.P. 12(h) 
Id. The Court further emphasized that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the 
parties. 
An appeal is not a prerequisite to raising an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See State 
v. Babbeli 813 P.2d 86. Just as noted in Brooks where the court compares an illegal sentence to 
subject matter jurisdiction it is clear that either may be raised at any time. 
" an illegal sentence is void, a trial court may corrrect 
an illegal sentence at any time. This Court has previoulsy 
recognized the continuing jurisdiction of a trial court to 
correct an illegal sentence. " 
uThe trial court has this power at any time, whether before 
or after an appeal, and even if there is no appeal. " 
Id. (emphasis added) 
There is no authority which suggests that subject matter jurisdiction has a time limit or 
procedure to follow when challenging it. If the Court is absent subject matter jurisdiction the 
judgment is void and can be challenged or raised at any time even without an appeal. Appellant's 
motion was timely. Appellant's motion was supported by the law. Appellant's motion should 
have been granted. Like a sentence in a criminal case which exceeds its statutory maximum so 
the order in this case which exceeded its rule maximum the equivalent discipline, is void. 
May challenges to subject matter jurisdiction be raised at any time, even for the first time 
on appeal? The answer is "Yes." 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court in Utah by rule must be limited to being equivalent to 
the order of the United States District Court. When the District Court in Utah exceeds the 
disciplinary sanctions as imposed by the United States District Court, it does so in excess of its 
jurisdiction and the judgment is void. Void judgments may be challenged at any time. Therefore, 
appellant requests that this Court reverse the judgment and order signed by Judge Quinn on 
February 5th, 2010, as it pertained to his order of December 8th, 2009, as well order that the relief 
sought in appellant's motion to correct judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of June, 2010. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Appellant Pro Se 
*g 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 21st day of June, 2010,1 served 
two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the 
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Adam C. Bevis #9889 
Billy L. Walker #3358 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dated this 21st day of June, 2010. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF : 
ATTORNEY, : 
v. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER : 
. — N^flrMy 
: PUBLIC REPRIMAND AND 
DISCIPLINARY ORDER 
: 2:05 AD 4 
2:06 MC 9H 
The Disciplinary Pane! of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, having 
reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Report and Recommendations of 
Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner, the objections filed by D. Bruce Oliver (Mr. Oliver), and the 
response of the Committee on the Conduct of Attorneys, finds that the report and 
recommendations are well supported by the record in tliis case and that the magistrate judge was 
thorough and fair. 
Mr. Oliver has also filed a motion to declare DUCivR 83-1.5 unconstitutional. The Panel 
notes that this disciplinary proceeding is not the proper forum to make such a determination nor 
can the Panel grant the relief sought. 
The Panel finds that Mr. Oliver has violated rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 8.4(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct by filing fiivolous complaints, claims and/or contentions and by 
failing to respond to orders to show cause, failing to respond to proper discovery requests and 
failing to withdraw fiivolous claims when requested by opposing counsel or when dispositive 
motions were filed. 
The Panel emphasizes that the record abundantly demonstrates Mr. Oliver's fundamental 
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lack of understanding of the proper relationship of counsel to clients, to the court, and to other 
litigants and counsel. Qualified counsel honestly analyze facts presented by a client; forthrightly 
communicate the weaknesses of a case to the client; carefully evaluate the viability of claims 
before filing; communicate clearly and timely with the court and others in the litigation process; 
and timely respond to requests and motions (rather than letting a default serve as a respotise). 
Mr. Oliver's conduct does not meet these standards. While this record does not include (direct 
factual information from the many clients who have been involved in these numerous cases, the 
Panel is very troubled by the implications of this record for those individuals whose cases have 
been dismissed or impaired. In addition, opposing parties and counsel have been directly 
affected by Mr. Oliver's inability to exercise the fundamental skills of honest and timely analysis 
and communication. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 
(1) D. BRUCE OLIVER shall be publically reprimanded and suspended from the 
practice of law before the United States District Court for the District of Utah, and 
precluded from appearing before any United States District Judge, United States 
Magistrate Judge or United States Bankruptcy Judge for not less than one year, 
(2) Mr. Oliver shall have a period of thirty days from the date of this order to wind up 
current legal affairs for matters pending before the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah. Mr. Oliver is to give notice to all clients and opposing 
counsel of his suspension and disqualification from the practice of law before this 
court. Each client is to be notified of the importance of obtaining new counsel, 
and Mr. Oliver shall follow the requirements of Rule 14-526 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct in winding down his matters before this court, 
(3) The Clerk of Court will unseal the Report and Recommendation in this case and 
all subsequent papers. This Order shall be sent to the Office of Professional 
Responsibility of the Utah State Bar, to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and to 
the American Bar Association's National Discipline Data Bank, and to all judges 
of the district and bankruptcy court, together with a copy of the Report and 
Recommendation, 
(4) Mr. Oliver shall meet the following conditions in order to be reinstated: he shall 
attend a class in professional responsibility sponsored by the Utah State Bar; 
demonstrate by affidavit that he has substantially reorganized his law practice so 
as to eliminate future misconduct mid acknowledge that he has violated the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct, and 
(5) If reinstated, Mr. Oliver shall be placed on a three-year period of probation. If a 
formal disciplinary complaint is filed to which Mr. Oliver has been given the 
opportunity to respond and the complaint is referred to the Committee for 
investigation during that probationary period, Mr. Oliver may be immediately 
suspended for six months, if the investigator finds that Mr. Oliver has again 
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violated rule 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 or 8.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
Dated this 4K_ day of April, 2007 
id Stewapr, District Judge 
lij^afme Disciplinary Panel 
David Nuffer, Magistrate Judge 
ufdith feoulden, Bantoiptcy Judge 
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Office of Professional Conduct * » % 645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834 > / " V 
Telephone (801) 531-9110 • FAX (801) 531-9912 • 1-800-698-9077 V A y 
E-mail opc@utahbarorg ^ A /* ^f/^ 
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June 5,2007 Q ^ <&> s / r 
o, • 
Chief Justice Christine M. Durham ht\ 
Utah Supreme Court ^X> 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: OPC Reciprocal Discipline Matter 07-0247 against D. Bruce Oliver 
Dear Chief Justice Durham: 
Pursuant to Rule 14-522(d) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability, the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") 
intends to seek reciprocal discipline against D. Bruce Oliver based upon 
action taken by the United States District Court for the District of Utah. In 
order to do so, the OPC must file a formal complaint against Mr. Oliver in 
the District Court. 
As background, Mr. Oliver has been disciplined for violating Rules 
3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 8.4(a), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Mr. Oliver 
practices in Salt Lake County, and the offenses were committed in Utah. 
Pursuant to the requirement of Rule 14-511(b) of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability, which states that the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court designates the county where the case will be tried, the 
OPC respectfully requests that the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake 
County be the designated court. The OPC anticipates that this would be 
convenient to OPC counsel and would not unduly inconvenience Mr. 
Oliver. 
Thank you for your attention in this matter 
Sinoferejy, 
Jarbara L. Townsend 
"Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
BLT/ad 
cc: D. Bruce Oliver S&W-B 
Barbara L Townsend, #5568 
Assistant Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-9110 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN - 9 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. J t i l 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
D. Bruce Oliver, #05120 '] 
Respondent. ] 
I FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
) ORDER OF RECIPROCAL 
) DISCIPLINE: REPRIMAND AND 
I SUSPENSION 
Civil No. 070909858 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
This matter carne before the Court based on a Petition for Reciprocal Discipline 
filed by the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"). Respondent, D. 
Bruce Oliver, represents himself. Barbara L. Townsend, Assistant Counsel, represents 
the OPC. 
The Court, having reviewed and considered the Petition for Reciprocal Discipline 
and having read all pleadings submitted by the Parties, having heard oral argument and 
taken the previously filed matters, the Court now enters it Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline. SxhihftC 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Oliver is an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah. 
2. Mr. Oliver has been practicing law for over 16 years. 
3. During his 16 years of practice, Mr. Oliver has handled numerous cases 
before the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division ("District 
Court"). 
4. On April 4, 2007, the District Court entered a Public Reprimand and 
Disciplinary Order publicly reprimanding Mr. Oliver and suspending Mr. Oliver from 
practicing before that court for a period of not less than one year based on his conduct 
in numerous cases before the District Court in violation of Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 
8.4(a). 
5. The facts and procedures of the District Court are as follows: 
a. Judge Paul G. Cassell filed an Attorney Misconduct Complaint against 
Mr. Oliver on August 23, 2005 based upon his review of 28 cases. 
Judge Cassell referred the matter to both the OPC and to the District of 
Utah's Disciplinary Panel ("the Paner). 
b. Judge David K. Winder, Chair of the Panel, referred the matter to the 
Committee on Conduct of Attorneys ("the Committee"). 
c. The Committee then designated one of its members, Peggy Tomsic, to 
investigate and review the materials submitted and to prepare a report 
and recommendation to the Panel as to what form of discipline, if any, 
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to impose on Mr. Oliver pursuant to DUCivR 83-1.5. 
d. Ms. Tomsic prepared a Report and Recommendation for the 
Committee based upon her investigation of the cases referred. 
e. The Report stated that in at least 18 of the cases referred to it, Mr. 
Oliver had "engaged in a disturbing practice of filing and prosecuting 
frivolous claims, knowingly delaying discovery responses, and/or 
knowingly failing to respond to orders to show cause." 
f. The Report also noted that Mr. Oliver engaged in further discovery 
misconduct after being referred to the Panel. 
g. The Committee adopted the Report and Recommendation and 
presented it to the Panel recommending to the Panel that Mr. Oliver be 
publicly reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for a 
period of three months. 
h. The Panel requested, pursuant to Rule 83-1.5(h)(3)(B), that the Chair 
of the Committee designate a neutral hearing examiner to hear the 
evidence against Mr. Oliver. 
i. Since no member of the Committee was able to serve as the neutral 
hearing examiner, Chief Judge Dee Benson issued an order 
designating Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner ("Hearing Examiner") as 
the neutral hearing examiner. 
. The Hearing Examiner set an evidentiary hearing for December 13 and 
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14, 2006 with a pretrial motion cut off date of December 1, 2006. 
k. On December 6, 2006, the Hearing Examiner issued a Scheduling 
Order stating that the hearing was to go forward as scheduled and that 
a ruling on the motions would be included in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. 
I. The evidentiary Hearing was held on December 13 and 14 with the 
Committee being represented by Ms. Tomsic and Mr. Oliver being 
represented by Orson B. West, 
m. On February 27, 2007, the Hearing Examiner issued his Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and also ruled on five motions that Mr. 
Oliver had filed just before the motion cut-off date. 
n. The findings of the Hearing Examiner are summarized as follows: 
On December 1, 2006, prior to the evidentiary hearing, Mr. 
Oliver filed five separate motions to dismiss the disciplinary 
action in its entirety. The Hearing Examiner's rulings on the 
motions were made part of his Findings. In his first motion to 
dismiss, Mr. Oliver contended that he was denied due process 
because he did not receive adequate notice of the charges 
against him and was not afforded the opportunity to be heard. 
The Hearing Examiner found that there was "no question that 
Mr. Oliver received ample notice of the charges against him and 
had a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against those 
charges." The first motion to dismiss was therefore denied. 
In his second motion to dismiss, Mr. Oliver contended that the 
allegations against him were quasi-criminal in nature and 
required a clear and convincing standard. The Hearing 
Examiner found that the appropriate standard was a 
preponderance of the evidence and also found that, in this case 
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it made no difference because "Mr. Oliver's violations of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct have been proved by clear 
and convincing evidence." Mr. Oliver's second motion to dismiss 
was therefore denied. 
In his third motion to dismiss, Mr. Oliver argued that he had 
already been sanctioned in some of the underlying matters and 
that therefore, the doctrine of collateral estopple prohibited 
further sanctions in those cases. The Hearing Examiner found 
that Mr. Oliver "failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to a 
collateral estopple defense." Therefore, Mr. Oliver's third 
motion to dismiss was denied. 
In his fourth motion to dismiss, Mr. Oliver contended that 
because he had already been publicly reprimanded by an article 
published in the Salt Lake Tribune, by the Tenth Circuit in a 
published decision, and by Magistrate Judge Wells in her report 
and recommendation to Judge Cassell any further sanction is 
barred by collateral estopple. The Hearing Examiner found that, 
even assuming that any of the other matters constituted a 
"public reprimand," that did not prohibit further and/or greater 
sanctions against Mr. Oliver for repeated violations of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct. The Hearing Examiner, thus, 
denied Mr. Oliver's fourth motion to dismiss. 
In his fifth motion to dismiss, Mr. Oliver argued that he had been 
deprived of due process because Mr. Roger Segal, acting Chair 
of the Committee, allegedly had a personal vendetta against 
him. According to the Hearing Examiner, "[o]ther than Mr. 
Oliver's speculation . . . he has provided no factual basis for his 
assertion." Therefore, the Hearing Examiner denied Mr. Oliver's 
fifth motion to dismiss. 
o. The Hearing Examiner found that the following specific cases 
illustrated Mr. Oliver's repeated violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct: 
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In Cook v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2:05cv16 TS, the 
Court dismissed the third cause of action based on Mr. Oliver's 
failure to respond to a motion to dismiss. Mr. Oliver's defense 
was that he did not need to respond because, in his opinion, the 
motion had merit. 
In Holmes v. Utah, 2:04cv940 PGC, Mr. Oliver filed a complaint 
for an adverse employment action. The Court issued an order 
to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure 
to serve process within 120. days. Mr. Oliver, in response, failed 
to appear stating that he and his client had voluntarily agreed 
not to pursue the case. 
In Drake v. Utah, 2:04cv689 DAK, the action was dismissed 
after Mr. Oliver failed to respond to motion to dismiss. Mr. 
Oliver's response to this allegation was that he did not respond 
to the motion because it had merit. 
In Bohn v. Jordan School District, 2:04cv531 RS, the court 
issued an order to show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to serve process within 120 days. Although 
the order to show cause specifically stated that the plaintiff was 
directed to respond in writing, Mr. Oliver did not respond. His 
defense to this allegation was that he believed that not 
responding was an option given by the court. 
In McGraw v. Salt Lake Community College, 2:03cv765 TS, Mr. 
Oliver failed to respond to a motion to dismiss the RICO claims 
he had filed. His defense to this allegation was that RICO 
claims seem to be unwelcomed in Utah. Subsequently, the 
court dismissed all the claims except a Title VII claim. The court 
issued an order to show cause on the remaining claim because 
of plaintiff's lengthy silence on that claim in the case. Mr. Oliver 
stated that he allowed the dismissal of the remaining claim for 
tactical reasons. 
In Riveria v. Salt Lake Community College, 2:03cv764 DB, 
opposing counsel filed three motions to compel after Mr. Oliver 
had failed to provide discovery responses. After the third 
motion to compel was filed, Mr. Oliver advised opposing counsel 
that he would be withdrawing because of a conflict. Before he 
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withdrew from the case he promised to provide the outstanding 
discovery. Three months after notifying counsel of his conflict, 
he filed a withdrawal notice and notice to stay the proceedings. 
He failed to provide the discovery responses and failed to 
respond to the motions to compel. 
In Beene v. Utah, 2:02cv322 DAK, the court granted Rule 11 
sanctions against Mr. Oliver for bringing non-meritorious 
Eleventh Amendment claims against the Attorney General's 
Office, after the court had already instructed him on at least 
three other occasions that the Attorney General's Office was 
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. The court imposed a sanction in the amount of 
$500. 
In Salas v. Brems, 2:02cv273 TS, Mr. Oliver filed a complaint on 
behalf a client. The court issued an order to show cause why 
the matter should not be dismissed. Mr. Oliver failed to respond 
and the matter was dismissed. Mr. Oliver's defense was that 
the client had disappeared and the case was filed only to avoid 
a malpractice action by the client. 
In Martin v. Salt Lake Community College, 2:04cv141 DB, Mr. 
Oliver filed a complaint alleging discrimination under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although, at the time he filed the 
complaint, it was contrary to controlling case law. Mr. Oliver 
requested leave to file an amended complaint, which the court 
granted him 30 days to file. No amended complaint was filed 
and the court dismissed the action. 
In Trujillo v. Group 4 Falck, 2:02cv 162 TC, Mr. Oliver failed to 
respond to a motion to dismiss and two of the three plaintiffs 
were dismissed from the case. Mr. Oliver's defense was that 
the motion had merit, and therefore, no response was 
necessary. 
In Spitler v. Ogden City Corp., 1:03cv 119 PGC, Mr. Oliver failed 
to comply with discovery requests. Two motions to compel 
were filed and one was granted. The court imposed sanctions 
of $4800 against Mr. Oliver. The court later also granted 
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summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the claims Mr. 
Oliver asserted against the defendants. 
In Jaramillo v. Price, 2:02cv619 DB, the court granted summary 
judgment granted against Mr. Oliver's client and ordered Mr. 
Oliver to pay attorney fees based on the insufficient basis upon 
which the lawsuit was filed. 
In Joseph v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2:00cv340 DAK, the court 
granted Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Oliver for filing pleadings 
with unsupported allegations of criminal and professional 
misconduct against the opposing party and opposing counsel. 
The court granted, in part, the Attorney General's motion to 
dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. 
The court admonished Mr. Oliver for bringing unmeritorious 
claims and awarded attorney fees to the defendant in the 
amount of $2340. 
In O/seth v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2:00cv402 TC, The court 
dismissed the complaint after Mr. Oliver failed to respond to an 
order to show cause for failure to prosecute after nearly two 
years of inactivity. Mr. Oliver stated that he did nol respond 
because his client had disappeared. 
In Johnson v. Salt Lake Community College, 2:03cv1050 PGC, 
Mr. Oliver filed an opposition to a motion to dismiss over two 
weeks late without explanation for the late filing. Later, Mr. 
Oliver stated that it was not late because the motion had been 
converted to a motion for summary judgment However, in his 
late filing, he repeatedly referred to the motion as a motion to 
dismiss. 
In Lee v. Smith's Food and Drug, 2:03cv810 TC, the court 
granted defendants' motion to compel after Oliver failed to 
provide initial disclosures and discovery responses. 
Defendant's counsel repeatedly, by phone and letter, attempted 
to obtain the responses from Mr. Oliver. Mr. Oliver repeatedly 
promised responses but failed to produce them. Mr. Oliver also 
failed to respond to the motion to compel. Mr. Oliver admits that 
he did not provide the requested discovery responses in a 
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timely way but stated that he streamlined his staff and office 
procedures to rectify the problem. 
In Fox v. Triton Investments, Inc., 2:02cv628 PGC, Mr. Oliver 
promised to update the court as to the status of the case. The 
court issued an order to show cause why the matter should not 
be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mr. Oliver testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that he could not move the case forward 
because his client had been arrested on a federal charge and 
no longer had contact with the client. Mr. Oliver failed to update 
the court as he promised and failed to respond to the order to 
show cause. 
In Matthews v. South Ogden, 1:03cv117 PGC, Mr. Oliver 
responded to an order to show cause that directed his client to 
explain why he had not responded to a motion to compel. In his 
response, Mr. Oliver conceded that he failed to respond 
because the motion had been well founded; it was his fault, not 
his clients; and that an award for attorney fees would be 
appropriate in the case. 
In Palmer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2:04cv956 DAK, Mr. Oliver 
engaged in conduct that the Magistrate found to be sanctionable 
and warranted a dismissal of the case. Opposing counsel 
attempted to obtain discovery responses and set depositions. 
After failing to do so, opposing counsel filed a motion to compel. 
During the hearing concerning the motion to compel, the 
Magistrate initially was going to recommend that the case be 
dismissed based on Mr. Oliver's assertion that he could not 
attend a deposition because of a scheduling conflict. Mr. Oliver 
was sanctioned in the amount of $2688.26. The court warned 
Mr. Oliver that if he further failed to cooperate with opposing 
counsel and court orders, the action would be dismissed. 
Thereafter, opposing counsel filed a second motion for 
sanctions and motion to strike to which Mr. Oliver failed to reply. 
The Magistrate recommended that the case be dismissed based 
on Mr. Oliver's continued discovery abuses. The District Court 
judge adopted the recommendation from the Magistrate and 
dismissed the case. 
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o. The Hearing Examiner wrote in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law that "Mr. Oliver's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was often 
incredible and at times outrageous, 
p. He was antagonistic, defensive, arrogant, and combative in his 
testimony." 
q. The Hearing Examiner gave numerous examples of the testimony that 
he felt demonstrated a defiant attitude on the part of Mr. Oliver, 
r. The Hearing Examiner concluded his remarks by stating that Mr. 
Oliver's testimony "revealed that, at best, Mr. Oliver is completely 
uninformed about his professional responsibilities, and at worst, he 
was lying under oath." 
s. The Hearing Examiner concluded that Mr. Oliver understood that his 
practice before the United States District Court was governed by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Professional 
Responsibility, 
t. Further, the Hearing Examiner noted that Mr. Oliver understood that 
the District Court had the authority to sanction him for any violations of 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, 
u. According to the Hearing Examiner, despite Mr. Oliver's professed 
understanding of the rules, "he has knowingly engaged in a pattern of 
not responding to legitimate discovery requests, orders to show cause, 
and dispositive motions, and continued that pattern even after Judge 
Cassell filed the Complaint in this matter." 
v. Mr. Oliver was charged with violating rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 8.4(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
w. Based upon the specific cases, the report and recommendations of the 
Committee and Mr. Oliver's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the 
Hearing Examiner concluded that: (1) Mr. Oliver violated rules 3 1 and 
8.4(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by filing frivolous 
complaints, claims, and/or contentions; and (2) Mr. Oliver violated rules 
3.2, 3.4, and 8.4(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by 
failing to respond to orders to show cause, failing to respond to proper 
discovery requests, and failing to withdraw frivolous claims either upon 
request by opposing counsel or when dispositive motions were filed 
relative to those claims. 
x. The Hearing Examiner found the following aggravating circumstances 
to have been proven not only by a preponderance of the evidence, but 
by clear and convincing evidence: (1) Mr. Oliver was disciplined by the 
District Court on at least'eight occasions for discovery violations, rule 
11 violations, or filing baseless claims; (2) Mr. Oliver engaged in a 
pattern of misconduct; (3) Mr. Oliver committed multiple offenses by 
violating rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 8.4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
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Professional Conduct; (4) Mr. Oliver refuses to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his conduct; and (5) Mr. Oliver has substantial 
experience in the practice of law. 
y. As a mitigating circumstance, the Hearing Examiner found that there 
was no evidence that Mr. Oliver's conduct was driven by a dishonest or 
selfish motive, 
z. In view of this, the Hearing Examiner found that "any mitigating 
circumstances are substantially outweighed by the aggravating factors 
based on the facts that (a) Mr. Oliver has been admonished and/or 
sanctioned by the court to no avail in several of the underlying cases, 
(b) he has continued his pattern of misconduct after the Complaint was 
filed in this matter, and (c) he has continued to refuse to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of his misconduct." 
aa.The Hearing Examiner concluded that the six-month suspension that 
was recommended by the Committee was not sufficient. 
bb.The Hearing Examiner recommended to the Panel that Mr. Oliver be 
publicly reprimanded and suspended him from the practice of law 
before the United States District Court for the District of Utah for a 
period of at least one year. 
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cc. The Hearing Examiner also recommended that, while suspended and 
prior to reinstatement, Mr. Oliver is required to attend a class on 
professional responsibility from the Utah State Bar. 
dd.The Hearing Examiner further recommends that, as a condition of 
reinstatement, Mr. Oliver file an affidavit required under DUCCivR 83-
1.5(i) that he has reorganized his law practice and he acknowledges 
his conduct violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
ee.The Hearing Examiner finally recommended that upon reinstatement, 
Mr. Oliver be placed on three-year probation, 
ff. If at any time Mr. Oliver again violates the above-mentioned Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct and after a formal disciplinary 
complaint, Mr. Oliver is to be immediately suspended for six months. 
gg.The Disciplinary Panel reviewed the Hearing Examiner's Findings and 
the objections filed by Mr. Oliver and found that the Findings were "well 
supported by the record in this case and that the magistrate judge was 
thorough and fair." 
hh.The Panel adopted the Committee's finding that Mr. Oliver violated 
Rules 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 8.4(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct and adopted the discipline recommended by the Hearing 
Examiner. 
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ii. The Public Reprimand and Disciplinary Order of the Panel was entered 
on April 4, 2007 and ordered Mr. Oliver to be suspended from the 
practice of law in the District Court for one year. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. The Court's review of the disciplinary process from the federal Court is 
very limited. 
2. Roger Segal's presence on the Committee did not violate Mr. Oliver's due 
process rights by depriving him of notice or an opportunity to be heard. 
3. Simply because a federal magistrate judge conducted the disciplinary 
hearing in this case, does not mean that Mr. Oliver was deprived of a trial de novo 
before the district Court judge. 
4. Since, in this case, the hearing officer's decision is referred to the 
Committee and the Committee may either accept of reject or modify the report, Mr. 
Oliver was not entitled to a de novo review before a district court judge. 
5. The Findings of Fact of Magistrate Warner are thorough, detailed and 
reflect the full opportunity Mr. Oliver had to present and argue his case. 
6. Any technical defects do not rise to the level of denying Mr. Oliver an 
opportunity to be heard. 
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7. That a different practice exists in state Court versus federal Court does not 
justify Mr. Oliver's refusal to obey a Court's order when that order was sufficiently clear 
to alert Mr. Oliver that something was required of him in federal Court. 
8. Since simply ignoring the order in federal Court was not appropriate, it 
was hot grave injustice for Mr. Oliver to be disciplined for this conduct. 
9. Res Judicata does not apply to this case because the issues and rule 
violations previously before the OPC were different than the issues and rule violations 
before the federal Court for which Mr. Oliver was disciplined. 
10. Mr. Oliver's offenses are more than technical defects. 
11. Mr. Oliver's seven years of repeat violations of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct constitute far more than technical defects. 
12. Mr. Oliver is not being singled out for technical defects in his pleadings, 
but for the fact of his unprofessional conduct. 
13. Because Mr. Oliver's conduct was found to be knowing and to have 
caused potential harm to the justice system, the presumptive discipline is suspension. 
14. The mitigating evidence in Mr. Oliver's favor was not ignored, rather the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed any such mitigating circumstances, so that any 
deviation in discipline would tend towards increased discipline, not less. 
15. Client testimony is not required to sanction attorneys because attorney 
conduct is governed by rules not by the opinions of or testimony or an attorney's client. 
16. Mr. Oliver's conduct was sanctionable under Utah law. 
17. The federal procedures against Mr, Oliver did not deprive him of his due 
process rights. 
18. The imposition of equivalent discipline against Mr. Oliver in state Court 
would not result in grave injustice. 
19. Mr. Oliver's misconduct does not warrant substantially different discipline 
in this Court. 
20. Based on the foregoing, reciprocal discipline in the state Court of Utah is 
appropriate. 
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE 
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Mr. Oliver's 
misconduct and violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED THAT: 
D. Bruce Oliver is hereby reprimanded and suspended for his conduct in the 
United States District Court for Utah as follows: 
1. That Mr. Oliver is publicly reprimanded and suspended from the practice 
of law in the State of Utah for a period of one year. 
2. That, while suspended and prior to reinstatement, Mr. Oliver is required to 
attend a class on professional responsibility from the Utah State Bar. 
3. That, as a condition of reinstatement, Mr. Oliver file an affidavit required 
by the United States District Court for Utah under DUCCivR 83-1.50) in this Court as 
well as the District Court that he has reorganized his law practice and he acknowledges 
his conduct violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
4. That upon reinstatement, Mr. Oliver be placed on three-year probation. If 
at any time Mr. Oliver again violates the above-mentioned Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct and after a formal disciplinary complaint, Mr. Oliver is to be immediately 
suspended for six months. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that during the one year suspension, Mr. Oliver is 
hereby enjoined and prohibited from practicing law in the State of Utah, holding himself 
out as an attorney at law, performing any legal services for others, giving legal advice to 
others, accepting any fee directly or indirectly for rendering legal services as an 
attorney, appearing as counsel or in any representative capacity in any proceeding in 
any Utah court or before any Utah administrative body as an attorney (whether state, 
county, municipal, or other), or holding himself out to others or using her name in any 
manner in conjunction with the words "Attorney at Law", "Counselor at Law", or 
"Lawyer"; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Oliver shall comply with all parts of Rule 14-
525 of the RLDD concerning reinstatement to the practice of law in the State of Utah 
one year from the effective date of this order; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Oliver shall comply with all parts of Rule 14-
526 of the RLDD and to begin the one year suspension on the effective date of this 
order. Pursuant to Rule 14-526(a) of the RLDD Mr. Oliver shall have thirty (30) days 
from the date of this order to wind down his practice, thus the effective date of this order 
is thirty (30) days from the date of this order. 
r/* 
DATED this the f day of fWh, 2007. 
A n
, 
Third Judici 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ day of "CWJu^M 2007, I mailed via United 
States Mail, first class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF 
RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE: REPRIMAND AND SUSPENSION to 
D. Bruce Oliver 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1490 
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Rule 14-509 
Rule 14-509. Grounds for discipline. 
I t shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; 
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening panel imposing discipline; 
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction; 
(d) fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 14-526(e); or 
(e) fail to notify the OPC of public discipline in another jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 14-522(a). 
<ixUVfc-,f "D 
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Rule 14-522 
Rule 14-522. Reciprocal discipline. 
(a) Duty to notify OPC counsel of discipline. Upon being publicly disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, or 
a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Utah shall within 30 days inform 
the OPC of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court has been publicly disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary 
jurisdiction, OPC counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order. 
(b) Notice served upon lawyer. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to 
practice in Utah has been publicly disciplined by another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having 
disciplinary jurisdiction, OPC counsel shall issue a notice directed to the lawyer containing: 
(b)(1) a copy of the order from the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory body; and 
(b)(2) a notice giving the lawyer the right to inform OPC counsel, within 30 days from service of the notice, of any 
claim by the lawyer predicated upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (d), that the imposition of the equivalent 
discipline in Utah would be unwarranted, and stating the reasons for that claim. 
(c) Effect of stay of discipline in other jurisdiction. If the discipline imposed in the other court, jurisdiction or 
regulatory body has been stayed, any reciprocal discipline imposed in Utah shall be deferred until the stay expires. 
(d) Discipline to be imposed. Upon the expiration of 30 days from service of the notice pursuant to paragraph (b), 
the district court shall take such action as may be appropriate to cause the equivalent discipline to be imposed in 
this jurisdiction, unless it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated that: 
(d)(1) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due 
process; 
(d)(2) the Imposition of equivalent discipline would result in grave injustice; or 
(d)(3) the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in Utah or is not misconduct in this 
jurisdiction. 
If the district court determines that any of these elements exist, it shall enter such other order as it deems 
appropriate. The burden is on the respondent to demonstrate that the imposition of equivalent discipline is not 
appropriate. 
(e) Conclusiveness of adjudication in other jurisdictions. Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) above, a final 
adjudication of the other court, jurisdiction or regulatory body that a respondent has been guilty of misconduct shall 
establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in Utah. 
£*!,•. Vet I 
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United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice 
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way 
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President 
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the 
United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by 
a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or 
any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article. 
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Utah Constitution / Code 
Article VIII Judicial Department 
Section Section 4 [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court — Judges pro tempore — Regulation of practice 
of law.] 
Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court — Judges pro tempore — 
Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore 
shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme 
Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
No History for Constitution 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 00I08_000400.ZIP 1,944 Bytes 
«Previous Section (Article VIIL Section 3) Next Section (Article VIIL Section 5 ) » 
diSearch 7.64 (7876) 
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Rule 60 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power 
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside 
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE 
OF, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
D BRUCE OLIVER, 
Respondent. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No: 070909858 
Judge: ANTHONY B QUINN 
Date: December 8, 2009 
Respondent's Motion to Correct Order for Lack of Jurisdiction is 
Denied. The motion is untimely. There is no matter raised in 
the motion that implicates the jurisdiction of the Court. The 
motion simply seeks to correct what Respondent believes is a 
legal error. The time limits of Rule 59 apply to such a request. 
Date: \l\<b\0°\ 
By / 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE 
OF, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
D BRUCE OLIVER, 
Respondent. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No: 070909858 
Judge: ANTHONY B QUINN 
Date: February 5, 2010 
The Court hereby adopts its Minute Entry of December 8, 2009 as an 
order in this case. No other order is necessary. 
Date: 2[«?//6 
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